INVESTMENT FACILITATION FOR DEVELOPMENT IN WTO AND
INDIA – ECONOMY
News: Some
advice to India on the IFA negotiations
What's in the news?
● The
proposed IFA in WTO is meant to create legally binding provisions aimed at
facilitating investment flows.
Key takeaways:
● Backed
by more than 100 countries, the legal obligations inter alia will require
states to augment regulatory transparency and predictability of investment
measures.
What is Investment Facilitation for Development?
● In
December 2021, 112 WTO members co-sponsored a Joint Statement on Investment
Facilitation for Development.
● Among
112 WTO members of this joint initiative, India
is not a part of it.
● Aims
at developing a multilateral agreement
on Investment Facilitation for Development that will improve the investment and business climate, and make it easier for
investors in all sectors of the economy to invest, conduct their day-to-day
business and expand their operations.
● Facilitating
greater participation of developing and least-developed members in global
investment flows also constitutes a core objective of the future
Agreement.
● The
initiative does not cover market access, investment protection and
investor-state dispute settlement.
● The
proposed IFA is meant to create legally
binding provisions aimed at facilitating investment flows.
● The
legal obligations inter alia will require
states to augment regulatory transparency and predictability of investment
measures.
● This
agreement will be very different from
investment protection agreements such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that allow foreign investors to
bring claims against the host state for alleged treaty breaches. This is known
as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
Concerns of India:
1. India suspects the need
for new initiative: To the extent investment
is related to trade it is already included in the TRIMs agreement and under
mode 3 related to FDI in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
2. India suspects the
channel used for enactment of this initiative:
Plurilateral route of negotiations under which investment facilitation is being
discussed has no legitimacy in the WTO. India has naturally not participated in
the discussions and has not formally commented on the successive texts.
3. ‘Investment facilitation
for development’ is evidently a misnomer:
There are hardly any development provisions, except extended time periods for
implementation and the promised technical assistance. The proposed agreement
would be too burdensome for developing countries and LDCs, because nearly all
of the obligations that may be created are on host countries.
4. Apprehension about
misinterpretation: one of the reasons
India is not a party to IFA (Investment Facilitation agreement) negotiations is
the apprehension that foreign investors could use a future IFA to bring claims
under the existing BITs. Arguably, foreign investors may use the most favored
nation (MFN) provision in BITs to borrow or import stipulations from the IFA
perceived to be more advantageous than those given in the underlying BIT.
5. Fear of being sued by
Foreign Investors in ISDS (Investor-state dispute settlement)
6.
An investor can use ISDS to seek compensation for -
a. The
expropriation of a foreign investor's property.
b. Discrimination
and minimum standards of treatment, denial of justice.
Go back to Basics
Bilateral Investment Treaty
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How should India overcome its concerns of ISDS?
1. Many
BITs exempt an economic integration agreement from the application of MFN.
Thus, the possibility of foreign
investors successfully importing IFA provisions into the BIT is remote.
2. It
is doubtful that an ISDS tribunal will accept the argument that mere
non-compliance with IFA breaches an investor’s legitimate expectations. The
only exception to this will be if a State has included its IFA commitments as
part of the specific assurances to the foreign investor luring her to invest
and then goes back on these assurances without a proportionate public policy
justification. Thus, a binding IFA,
minus other things, cannot be the basis of an investor’s legitimate
expectations.
3. Most
new investment treaties avoid ‘umbrella clauses’ altogether. This limits the possibility
of investors suing states for non-compliance of IFA obligations as a breach of
a BIT’s ‘umbrella clause’.
4. Moreover,
the IFA can be firewalled from BITs by the former unequivocally stating that it
cannot be used to interpret or apply any rule for the protection of investment
contained in any investment treaty.
5. The
IFA can also categorically state that it does not create rights for
non-signatory countries and their investors. Indeed, the draft IFA text
includes such language aimed at isolating the IFA from BITs and ISDS.
Conclusion:
Countries
can overcome this problem by amending
their respective BITs to exclude the IFA from its scope. Given the sizable
number of 100plus countries pushing for the IFA, who wish to insulate it from
ISDS, these countries can agree among themselves to reform their BITs to
reflect this will. In fact, the BIT reform process is already underway, with
older treaties being replaced with newer ones that contain more balanced
provisions.