INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY – DEFENCE AND SECURITY
News: 25th
anniversary of Pokhran-II: India’s journey to become a nuclear power
What's in the news?
● On
this day 25 years ago, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that
India had conducted three nuclear tests at Pokhran.
Pokhran Nuclear Test:
Pokhran 1:
● Pokhran-I
was India's first nuclear bomb test conducted on May 18, 1974, at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan.
● It
was code-named Smiling Buddha and
officially described as a "peaceful
nuclear explosion" with “few military implications”.
● India became the 6th
country in the world to possess nuclear weapons capability after the US, Soviet
Union, Britain, France and China.
Pokhran 2:
● Pokhran-II
refers to a sequence of five nuclear bomb test explosions conducted by India on
between 11-13th May 1998 at
Rajasthan's Pokhran desert.
● Code
name - Operation Shakti, this event
marked India's 2nd successful attempt.
Significance:
● Pokhran-II
cemented India's status as a nuclear
power.
● It
demonstrated India's ability to possess and deploy nuclear weapons, thus
enhancing its deterrence capabilities.
● The
Indian government led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee officially declared itself as a state
possessing nuclear weapons following Pokhran-II.
India's stand in various treaties related to nuclear
weapons:
1. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968:
● India
is not a signatory - it declined to
accede to the NPT, citing concerns about the treaty's perceived discriminatory
nature and lack of reciprocal obligations from nuclear weapons states.
2. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT):
● India
has not signed the CTBT as it is a
strong advocate for a time-bound disarmament commitment from nuclear weapon
states (NWS) and may use the lack of a commitment as a reason to refrain from
signing the CTBT.
3. Nuclear Weapons Bans Treaty:
● It
is the first treaty of its kind against nuclear armament. This treaty looks at
prohibiting the use of atomic weapons, aiming to eliminate them.
● It
entered into force on 22 January 2021 and India is not a member of this treaty.
4. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG):
● It
is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to contribute to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of
Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
● India
is not a member of the NSG.
5. Wassenaar Arrangement:
● It
is a voluntary export control regime.
● India joined
the arrangement in December 2017 as its 42nd participating state.
India's Nuclear doctrine:
1. No First Use (NFU):
● India
committed to not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict but would
retaliate if attacked with such weapons.
2. Credible Minimum Deterrence:
● India
would maintain a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear
attack, but it would not seek to match other countries’ arsenals in size.
3. Non-use Against Non-Nuclear Weapon States:
● India
would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not
possess them.
4. Retaliation to a Nuclear Attack:
● If
India is subject to a nuclear attack, it would retaliate, causing massive
damage to the aggressor.
Evolution of India's Nuclear Doctrine:
● Origin:
The first nuclear test in 1974 was termed as ' peaceful nuclear explosion' by
India.
● Nuclear Doctrine 1999:
After the second nuclear test in 1998, India's national security advisory board
had released India's nuclear framework. It emphasised the ' No first use '
policy.
● Official Nuclear Doctrine
2003: In 2003 Indian government officially reasserted ' No first use ' policy and also
emphasised ' Credible minimum deterrence ' policy. India also stated that it
would not use nuclear weapons against non nuclear states.
Advantages of India's No First Use policy:
1. Credibility and Clarity:
● India’s
nuclear doctrine provides a clear and credible stance on the country’s position
regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
● The
“No First Use” policy clearly
signals that India views nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and not as an
offensive tool, which contributes to regional stability.
2. Control of civilian leadership:
● Hair-trigger
alert, to ensure that the other side does not get a chance to strike first,
does not have to be maintained and so forces and equipment can be in a relaxed
posture.
● Nuclear
forces can be maintained in a de-mated condition waiting for orders from higher
echelons to go to a higher alert status, thus ensuring that command and control
stays firmly with the civilian political leadership.
3. Help India to become a member in NSG:
● Strict
adherence to the doctrine can strengthen India’s efforts to gain membership in
the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
4. Supports Disarmament Goals:
● The
“Credible Minimum Deterrence” stance aligns India with global disarmament goals
and reduces the chances of a costly arms race.
5. Reinforces India’s Responsible Image:
● The
doctrine’s principles, especially the “No First Use” policy and “Non-use
Against Non-Nuclear Weapon States”, reinforce India’s image as a responsible
nuclear power.
● This
has strategic benefits for India in terms of its international standing and
relations with other countries.
6. Mitigates the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War:
● The
doctrine’s “No First Use” policy reduces the risk of an accidental nuclear war,
as it removes the pressure for a rapid decision to launch in a crisis. This
allows for a more measured response, potentially averting catastrophe.
7. Achieve other Economic targets:
● A
No First Use doctrine is cheaper to implement; for India, which has many
economic targets to achieve, this is a very important factor.
Challenges against the No First Use policy:
1. Changing Regional Nuclear Dynamics:
● India’s
nuclear doctrine is being tested by the rapidly changing security dynamics in
its region.
● The
modernization and expansion of China’s
nuclear capabilities pose a significant challenge to India’s policy of
minimum deterrence.
● This
transformation in the nuclear landscape could potentially strain India’s
ability to respond effectively in a crisis.
2. Vulnerability to First Strike:
● The
“No First Use” policy potentially exposes India to a damaging first strike from
an adversary.
● Critics
argue that in such a case, India’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike could
be significantly compromised.
3. Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons:
● In
India the NFU policy has been called into question on the grounds that it
allows Pakistan to take the initiative while restricting India’s options
militarily and puts India in a disadvantageous position.
● Pakistan’s low nuclear
thresholds and its policy of using its nuclear umbrella to foment
sub-conventional conflict in India is the principal reason behind the debate
around India’s ‘no first use’ policy.
● Nuclear
weapons are often seen as an antidote to conventional inferiority as the
inferior party will seek to deter conventional attack by threatening a nuclear
response.
Implications of abandoning No First Use policy:
1. Reduces India's credibility:
● Withdrawing
the NFU policy and making a declaration to that effect can affect India’s
status as a responsible nuclear power.
2. Nuclear arms race:
● Withdrawing
from the No First Use policy will increase the arms race particularly nuclear
arms race between India and China which affects both the countries
economically.
3. Affect regional peace and stability:
● India's
withdrawal from No First Use policy will seriously affect the regional
stability and peace among the neighbouring non nuclear countries also.
4. Hindrance to the Nuclear Supply Group membership:
● India is trying to join
the elite Nuclear Supply Group.
● India's
withdrawal from No First Use policy will exacerbate the hindrance of India's
membership in the NSG group.
WAY FORWARD:
1. Maintain Strategic Restraint:
● India
should continue to adhere to its current nuclear doctrine of “No First Use” and
“Credible Minimum Deterrence”.
● These
policies have served India well by maintaining regional stability and
preserving its international reputation as a responsible nuclear state.
2. Invest in Missile Defence Systems:
● To
counter the growing threat from China’s
modernising nuclear arsenal, India should invest in developing and
deploying advanced missile defence
systems.
● This
could offer an additional layer of protection against potential nuclear
strikes.
3. Regular dialogues with regional nuclear states:
● India
should engage in regular strategic dialogues with its nuclear-armed neighbours,
China and Pakistan.
● This
can help in managing mutual concerns, reducing misunderstandings, and
preventing potential conflicts.
4. Promote Nuclear Disarmament:
● India
should continue advocating for global nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation. This includes supporting international treaties aimed at
nuclear disarmament and urging other nuclear states to adopt “No First Use”
policies.
The
NFU policy is just right for India as it ensures security for the nation and
does not detract it from its march towards better prosperity for its people.