INDIA - CHINA RELATIONS – INTERNATIONAL
News: Rajnath Singh addresses the Parliament over Chinese transgression in Arunachal Pradesh, Opposition members walk out
What's in the news?
● Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops tried to transgress the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Yangtse area of Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh and “unilaterally” change the status quo, which was contested by Indian troops in a “firm and resolute” manner and compelled them to return, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has informed the Parliament while stating that there were “no fatalities or serious casualties” on the Indian side.
Key takeaways:
● Making a statement on the incident of December 9, Singh said, “The ensuing face off led to a physical scuffle in which the Indian Army bravely prevented the PLA from transgressing into our territory and compelled them to return to their posts. The scuffle led to injuries to few personnel on both sides.”
India-China Relations Backdrop:
● India-China-relations date back to more than 2,000 years ago. There have been cultural and economic ties between the two countries since ancient times.
● The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route between India and China, but is also credited for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia.
● India-China relationship was limited to pilgrimage and a little bit of trade till pre-1950s. However, a new chapter heralded after India got Independence in 1947 and the Communist Revolution took place in China in 1949.
● The modern relationship was set in motion in the 1950s when India became one of the first countries to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of mainland China.
● Also, Tibet had acted as a buffer between India and China for thousands of years. It was only after the 1950s that the two countries shared a common border after China invaded and occupied Tibet.
● However, relations between contemporary China and India have been characterized by border disputes, resulting in military conflicts like the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola incident in 1967, the 1987 Sino-Indian and the 2020 India-China skirmish.
● Since the late 1980s, both countries successfully rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties. In 2008, China became India's largest trading partner and the two countries extended their strategic and military relations to some extent.
● Today, China and India are the two most populous countries and fastest growing major economies in the world. Growth in diplomatic and economic influence has increased the significance of their bilateral relationship.
● Despite this, the relations between India and China have come under “severe stress” time and again in the last decade due to multiple border stand-offs along the Line of Actual Control.
Border disputes:
Factors for recent aggression:
1. India’s border infrastructure:
● India has been strengthening its border infrastructure along the LAC.
● The strengthening of the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road may have angered the Chinese. The Chinese demand in the ongoing negotiations is also premised on India stopping its infrastructure development.
2. Change in the status of J&K:
● One popular argument is that China’s move is driven by local factors such as India’s decision to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
3. Bilateral tensions:
● The relations between the two countries have been steadily deteriorating.
● India has been against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China further views India’s assertions regarding Gilgit-Baltistan as an implicit attack on the CPEC.
● India has put curbs and restrictions on Chinese foreign direct investment.
4. China’s internal dynamics:
● The internal pressures that have been generated within China - in part due to the COVID-19 pandemic, are also influencing Chinese behavior.
● The COVID-19 pandemic is the most serious health crisis that China has faced since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The Chinese economy has been on the downslide which is also contributing to increasing political pressure on the country’s leadership.
● The coupling of political and economic tensions has greatly aggravated pressures on Chinese leadership and the rising tide of anti-China sentiment the world over has further worsened matters.
● Chinese aggression has been observed not only along the LAC but also in the South China Sea. This might indicate deliberate planning on the part of the Chinese leadership to divert attention from domestic issues.
5. India’s alignment with the U.S.:
● While India professes to be non-aligned, it is increasingly perceived as having aligned with the U.S.
● India’s United States tilt is perhaps most pronounced in the domain of U.S.-China relations. Recent instances are often highlighted to confirm the perception that India tends to side with the U.S. and against China whenever there is a conflict of interest between the two.
● An evident degree of geopolitical convergence also exists between the U.S. and India in the Indo-Pacific, again directed against China.
● India is a member of the Quad (the U.S., Japan, Australia and India) which has a definite anti-China connotation.
● The U.S. President’s proposal of redesigning the G-7, including countries such as India (India has conveyed its acceptance), but excluding China, provides China yet another instance of India and China being in opposite camps.
● India is being increasingly projected as an alternative model to China, and being co-opted into a wider anti-China alliance which China clearly perceives as a provocation.
6. India’s traditional clout in its neighborhood was slipping:
● For India, tensions with Pakistan have been high keeping the troops occupied in the border areas.
● Nepal raised boundary issues with India.
● Sri Lanka is diversifying its foreign policy and China is making deep inroads into that region.
● Bangladesh was deeply miffed with the Citizenship Amendment Act.
● Even in Afghanistan, where Pakistan, China, Russia and the U.S. are involved in the transition process, India is out.
A confluence of all these factors, which point to a decline in the country’s smart power, allowed China to make aggressive moves on the LAC.
Concerns of the India-China Border disputes:
1. Against the peace agreement:
● Though the LAC has never been demarcated there had not been previous incidents in the valley. By now staking a claim to the entire Galwan Valley and up to the confluence of the rivers, China is, in India’s view, unilaterally altering the LAC.
● This goes against the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), under which India and China agreed to strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides.
2. Un-demarcated borders:
● The alignment of the LAC has never been agreed upon, and it has neither been delineated nor demarcated.
● There is no official map in the public domain that depicts the LAC. The current understanding of the LAC reflects the territories that are, at present, under the control of each side, pending a resolution of the boundary dispute.
3. Difference in claims:
● For the most part, in the western sector, the LAC broadly corresponds with the border as China sees it. However, India and China do not agree on the alignment of the LAC everywhere.
● Differences in perception, particularly in 13 spots in the western, middle and eastern sectors of the border, often lead to what are called “face-offs”, when patrols encounter each other in these grey zones that lie in between the different alignments. Some of these areas are Chumar, Demchok and the north bank of the Pangong Lake in the western sector, Barahoti in the middle sector, and Sumdorong Chu in the east.
4. Chinese tactics:
● China has, in several territorial disputes, intentionally left its claims ambiguous.
● The Chinese haven’t stuck to their previously agreed positions. China’s alignments of the LAC have kept changing.
● The border skirmishes along the Line of Actual Control seem to be indicative of the Chinese approach to use the border problem to pressurize India on other issues.
WAY FORWARD:
1. Prepare militarily:
● India needs to be prepared, continue to build roads and improve the infrastructure along the border, to keep itself ready to deal with any contingency.
● India must improve the military capacity of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command given its immense geostrategic value, as it overlooks Asia’s maritime strategic lifeline and the world’s most important global sea lane.
2. Pressure points:
● India could choose to leverage the sensitivity of the Chinese to the one-China policy and other vulnerabilities like the Tibet issue and Hong Kong protests, to force a change in China’s attitude.
● This would allow India to signal to China that it has options, and that China would be wise not to escalate these situations too far.
3. Shifting focus:
● To counter China India must look for options beyond LAC.
● The South China Sea/Indian Ocean Region maritime domain presents India with the best options where the regional geopolitical context is favorable.
● India should demonstrate that it is willing and capable of influencing the maritime balance in East Asia, where China faces off a combination of the United States, Vietnam, Australia, Indonesia and sometimes Malaysia and the Philippines as well.
● China perceives a vulnerability in the Malacca strait given its marked dependence on the sea lines of communication for its vast trade and energy imports.
4. Going global:
● India should go global to defend against China. India’s counter to Chinese power in the Himalayas should be to assume a more global role of its own.
● In Asia and Africa, debt-traps induced by the BRI are gradually stoking discontent. If India focuses on leveraging its advantages as a development partner, particularly in the post-COVID-19 era, it can use its newfound influence as a bargaining chip against Chinese interests in these countries.
5. Building alliances:
● India must build power-balancing alliances.
● Many countries are seeking leadership from other quarters to counter-balance Chinese influence. In Southeast Asia, countries are pushing back against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.
● This provides an opportunity to build partnerships with such countries to balance China’s growing influence.
● India can give itself leverage against China by improving its bilateral relationships with other countries that are similarly worried about China’s growing influence - such as Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and even the U.K.
● Several foreign policy experts argue that India’s strategic dealing with China has to begin with South Asia. In this regard, it is important to reinvigorate SAARC.
● One way to reinvigorate SAARC is to revive the process of South Asian economic integration.
6. Aligning with the United States:
● This is also an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly and unequivocally with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
● A closer alignment with the U.S. represents India’s opportunity to counter China, while efforts to foster regional partnerships and cultivate domestic military capabilities, although insufficient by themselves, could play a complementary role.
● Moving into a closer partnership with the US would allow India an opportunity to rebalance the Indo-Pacific region.
● India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.
7. Taking the long view:
● India’s leverage and balancing power within the Indo-Pacific and the world beyond stems from its strong democratic credentials, the dynamism of its economy, its leading role in multilateral institutions, and the strategic advantage of its maritime geography - an asset possessed by few other nations, and which must be deployed much more effectively to counterbalance the Chinese ingress into this oceanic space that surrounds us.
● The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to many of India’s Asian friends and partners enabling a high-resolution envisioning of Chinese aggressiveness.
8. Package deal:
● It involved both the countries recognizing the status quo - Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin and Indian sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh - on both fronts. This offer was first made by former Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1960. This offer is arguably the best formula for settlement according to historian Mahesh Shankar because the region is not strategically important to India.
● The offer was however rejected by former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as he was concerned that any concession, even in the west, would only invite further aggression from Beijing all across the frontier.
9. LAC-plus solution:
● The LAC-plus solution involved recognition of the status quo in the east and some concessions by China in the west. This offer, however, was not followed through on the Indian side.
● And very soon, in the year 1985, China hardened its stand against this offer and it has roughly remained the same till date.
It is time for India to boldly take the long view in this area as also on its South Asia policy. India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to take an active stand. Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in military power, resort must be sought in realpolitik. This would force China to reconsider its tactics and force it towards negotiations with India.